Presidential Leadership and Crisis Management

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Abstract
    Foreign policy crises are recurring and exceedingly dangerous. A considerable amount of research has been done in a variety of academic disciplines which attempt to understand the nature of crisis, the pressures decision makers face in a crisis, and what might be done to improve conflict resolution and crisis management skills. This paper attempts to focus that research on the American Presidency. What pressures is a president likely to face during a crisis? What potential hazards must be avoided? How can leaders diffuse tension and/or better manage crises? While crisis management is not a panacea, there are a variety of skills which can be brought to bear on a crisis which are designed to reduce the likelihood that crises will lead to open warfare.

    In Chinese, the character representing "crisis" has a double meaning: threat, and opportunity.[1] In a nuclear age, when the United States and the Soviet Union have a seemingly inexhaustible supply of nuclear weapons pointed at each other, it is difficult to see anything but the threat.

    However, if we are to survive as a civilization, we must find ways to turn this grave threat into an opportunity to settle our disputes by means short of war and violence. Given the history of distrust and conflict which has characterized the superpower relationship since World War II, one may be forgiven a bit of pessimism.

    When one speaks of reforming or changing the foreign policy operations of the United States one ordinarily looks to the presidency. The President, of course, is at the very center of the foreign policy process. From Thomas Jefferson's, "The transaction of business with foreign nations is executive altogether," to Woodrow Wilson's, "The initiative in foreign affairs, which the President possesses without any restriction whatever, is virtually the power to control them absolutely," to Harry S. Truman's, "I make foreign policy," to today, it has been to the President that the people, Congress, and the courts generally look for foreign policy leadership. Thus, by law, practice, and tradition, the President makes foreign policy.[2]

    In a crisis, the President is usually granted a wide breadth of powers. These emergency (or perogative) powers[3] assumed by the President have a variety of justifications. Clinton Rossiter laid out an elaborate rational for emergency Presidential power in *Constitutional Dictatorship*,[4] as did Arthur M. Schleslesinger Jr. in *The Imperial Presidency*,[5] Richard M. Pious in *The American Presidency*,[6] and Robert E. Di Clerico in

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The American President.[7] But, whatever the specific rationale, all agree that during a crisis, the body politic turns to the President to "save" the political system.

Since the President is the primary actor in the foreign policy process, it is the President who is considered responsible for developing a crisis management system. Dealing with crisis in an ad hoc, "I'll cross that bridge when I come to it" manner may be ill advised in a nuclear age. We must anticipate problems, set up procedures which are designed to reduce the risk that emergency foreign policy decisions will be dealt with in an atmosphere and under conditions which are not as conducive as they might be to rational analysis and decision-making.

If we will be forced to face continued competition and conflict which threatens to break out into open warfare, what steps might be taken to try and diffuse the tension and manage the crisis so as not to lead to war? How can we heighten our changes of dealing with conflicts and crisis short of war or surrender? How can we stop "crisis behavior" from interfering with sound, rational decision-making?[8]

Part of the answer rests in "crisis management", our ability to better understand the nature of crisis, and take steps which draw the parties away from war. Hilliard Roderick defines crisis management as consisting "of contingency planning prior to a crisis and the active management of a crisis once it occurs."[9] A crisis is meant to include a conflict which occurs suddenly, heightens tensions, where stakes are high (usually a threat to "vital" national interests), where there is little time to decide, where decision-makers are under intense pressure, in an atmosphere of uncertainty containing expectations of hostile action.

Crisis management is the final stage in the political/diplomatic process short of war (see Figure 1).[10] It is employed in a crisis when the threat makes politics (and policy making) as usual, untenable. Often, crisis management is all that stands between war and peace.

Crisis management is not a panacea, but it does attempt to diffuse the crisis, reduce tension, give both sides time to reflect, evaluate, reconsider. It attempts to given both sides the opportunity to reach agreement, avoid mistakes and miscalcula-

FIGURE 1
Escalation of Conflict

Fundamental Forces	Environment Pattern of Relations	Beginning of face off	Immediate Cause of Conflict	Face-off	Crisis Management Stage	Military Conflict

tion, and settle disputes before the "fog of crisis" overcomes both parties. If we can understand and appreciate the limits of crisis management, we can begin to employ certain measures which might reduce the risk that tensions will escalate into open conflict.

In an effort to develop a workable crisis management system, a President must face two questions: (1) What pressures and problems is a President likely to face in a crisis (both personal and institutional?) and (2) What can be done? In a world which grows increasingly dangerous, these are questions which must be answered, and problems which must be faced. To ignore these problem areas makes us more vulnerable to disaster, and less in control of our future.

Pressures Deriving From a Crisis

Among the many pressures a President is likely to face in a crisis are the following: shortness of *time* to act/decide; *seriousness* of consequences (high stakes); incomplete, incorrect or skewed *information*; psychological *prejudices* (e.g., misperception; fear, hatred, groupthink, etc); *complexity*; an atmosphere of *uncertainty*; poor *communication* with the adversary; *stress* or fatigue; and *bureaucratic* resistance. (Rarely will domestic/internal pressure be a factor in the early stages of a crisis due to the "rally 'round the flag" variable.[11]) As Ury and Smoke point out, "These factors press decision-makers to take hasty, often escalatory, action to protect vital interests. Through action and reaction, miscalculation and miscommunication, a runaway crisis and war may result."[12]

Time:

What you don't want in a crisis is for decision-makers to "go off half-cocked." While a crisis may require a speedy response, the danger of a decision being made on faulty, incomplete or incorrect information is enormous. It is because the decision-makers feels he doesn't have the time to check on information that the leader may rush to judgement. Was that bleep on the computer a sign of a Soviet attack? If so, how much time do I have to respond? 11 minutes, six minutes? If I don't decide now, quickly, will it be too late?

Because the dangers of a rash decision are so great for all involved, both sides have a stake in controlling the pace of crisis. If there can be a pause, a slowing down of events, then both sides will have an *opportunity* to verify information; exchange messages, (or even threats), and develop options short of war.

High Stakes:

By its very nature, a crisis implies high stakes, serious consequences for a wrong move. Since the perceived vital "national interest" is involved, leaders may be willing to risk a great deal to protect that which they feel is absolutely necessary to protect the sancity of their political/geographical interests.

If leaders are in fact willing to go to the brink to protect vital national interests, it is important for them to clearly understand which interests are vital, and which are secondary. For example, would the Soviet Union risk a nuclear war to come to

the aid of the Marxist leaders of a small and politically insignificant island a few hundred miles from the coast of the U.S.? Probably not. They would, however, be more inclined to stand up—militarily if necessary—to a threat to their control of Poland which they feel is a vital buffer zone.

Likewise, the United States could do little in a direct way, to aid Afghan rebels. Afghanistan is not vital to the U.S. national interest, and it would be foolish to risk nuclear war over Soviet intervention into that country. If, however, Marxist rebels began to make significant inroads in Mexico, the United States would be more inclined to intervene militarily.

Information:

Sound, rational decision-making requires good information, properly presented, clearly understood. As important as good information is, there is probably nothing more difficult for a decision-maker than finding information he can trust. There is nothing diabolical in this. Good information is a precious commodity, and even the President, who sits atop what, on the surface appears to be the world's most sophisticated information-gathering apparatus has difficulty getting information in which he can place confidence.

The information problem is exaggerated in a crisis. Time being short, it is difficult to check up on the validity of information. But in a crisis, reliable information is vital. While a decision-maker may get quantity (information overload), quality of information is the problem.

How can the decision-maker insure that the necessary information reaches him? Certainly there is no fool-proof system, but a leader who is aware of the potential pitfalls can gain a fighting change in the search for good information.

In a crisis, traditional patterns of interaction break down, and the President is, in a sense, free of the bureaucratic/institutional restraints under which he must usually operate. This being the case, the President is free to set up the information gathering/analyzing process with which he feels most comfortable. There is no iron-clad "best" system. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy formed what was called the Executive Committee of the NSC (ExCom). This was a collection of trusted advisors and military personnel whom Kennedy felt would give him a broad range of advice, and in whose judgments he generally trusted.[13]

Kennedy's decision to form ExCom, an ad hoc body of advisers, reflected his determination to get a broad range of advice, plus his recognition that the missile crisis required a "different" apparatus to gather and process information. This was not politics as usual, and given the vast array of uncertainty and problems, Kennedy decided to go beyond the normal advisory process, and set up a special unit.

Because Kennedy recognized the severity of the situation, and because his personality was open to the ExCom style, Kennedy was able to demand that the advice and information he received was the best possible given the limitations of the situation. He constantly challenged the validity of the information given him, he repeatedly questioned the assumption upon which advice was based, he demanded that all alternatives be explored before a consensus was reached.

This process did not—could not—guarantee a good decision, but it did improve the chances that a rational decision might be reached. This process sought to check and re-check information, question and re-question assumptions, explore and re-explore alternatives, walk and re-walk in the adversary's shoes. It sought to give the decision-maker (Kennedy) as much reliable data as could be collected.

While the ExCom style fit Kennedy, not all leaders may feel comfortable with such a process. Currently, the National Security Council (NSC) has a Crisis Management Center which attempts to ready the administration for any possible crisis which may emerge. It gathers and analyzes data about potential crisis areas, serves as a clearinghouse for crisis management information, and is the "institutional memory" of the Executive Branch from which decision makers can draw information about past crises in an attempt to bring experience to bear on the current crisis. Two additional units assist the NSC in crisis management: the Special Situation Group (SSG), chaired by the Vice President; and the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG), chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.[14]

Whatever the apparatus which a President employs, there are a variety of potential malfunctions in the advisory system which must be avoided. Decision makers must be careful not to accept information, advice or assumptions too readily. Critical thinking in a crisis is essential. This is especially true where information is concerned. Be careful when agreement comes too easily; avoid "yes men" who will too easily agree with the leader; be sure that all options are carefully reviewed; avoid isolation; be sure that a "devil's advocate"[15] is present (and listened to) who will challenge, question, and present unpopular ideas; avoid "group think"[16]; do not allow the personality of the decision-maker[17] to adversely affect the way information/advise is processed.

Psychological Prejudice:

Perception, or misperception[18] plays an enormous role in decision-making. Given that both U.S. and Soviet leaders have developed rather myopic, "devil" images of their adversaries[19], it is imperative that prejudices or pre-conceived notions do not dictate policy in a crisis. This is not to say that both sides should enter into the process with "a clear slate" as regards their evaluations of the adversary. Past interactions, historic relations, patterns of behavior are all relevant in evaluating the likely response of an adversary, but too easily we slip into the trap of dehumanizing an adversary. If we are to make rational decisions in a crisis we must be conscious of this temptation.

Misperception means that there is a discrepancy between *image* and *reality*. If our images are far removed from reality, we become victims of a thought process which is at odds with the real world. There are a number of forms of misperception which could interfere with sound decision-making: *Overconfidence* of a personal (excessively virile/macho self-image) or military (e.g., belief that a military solution is preferable over a diplomatic one) nature; *diabolical* image of the enemy (e.g., the view that there is a good guy-bad guy, devil-angel conflict)[20]; *information* problems (e.g., incomplete or inaccurate information); plus *institutional* forms of misperception (e.g., Groupthink).

Can we create a crisis control system which accounts for all human error and/or folly? Which can control misperception, miscommunication, panic or stupidity? There

is no foolproof system, but ways must be found—institutional and individual—to avoid misperception, misinformation, miscommunication, and rash action. To help us achieve these goals, it is essential to slow down the pace of events, explore all options and how they will be viewed by the adversary, open lines of communication between adversaries, and gives each side a chance to save face.

Additionally, if we wish to disengage emotions, a non-threatening posture is essential. If one side issues a public ultimatum, (e.g., "Back Down or War!"), one forces the adversary into a position where he may feel that he cannot "back away" from the conflict. If one wishes to avoid war, the crisis must be viewed as a non-zero-sum game. When one or both sides sees the conflict in zero-sum terms, where one side wins and the other loses, the likelihood of war increases significantly. Crisis management must be conscious of supplying non-escalatory, non-threatening options for both sides.

Complexity, Uncertainty, and Communication

Even under the best circumstances, problem-solving is difficult and confusing. In a crisis, these problems are compounded. Because of the complexity and uncertainty involved in crisis decision-making, it is all the more important for leaders to clearly identify the specific nature of the perceived threat and its relationship to the national interest.

Once the nature of the threatened interests are made clear, and it is determined to what extent vital national interests are in jeopardy, the information process becomes the focal point. In an effort to reduce the complexity to manageable proportions, good information is essential.

Additionally communication[21] with the adversary is necessary. Be it through direct leader-to-leader contact (via an improved Hot Line), diplomatic exchange, or informal contacts, both sides must *keep talking*. Only in this way can each side express its views in a clear and hopefully non-threatening manner. Only in this way can measures be devised which allow each side to slowly move away from crisis thinking/crisis behavior.

Stress and Fatigue:

In a crisis, decision-makers are put under an extraordinary amount of pressure. The stress and fatigue which results from seemingly endless hours or days of high pressure situations must take its toll on leaders. The question is, what impact will it have?[22]

In these high pressure situations the decision-maker may be more vulnerable to error. Stress can impair the decision-makers judgement. The cumulative effect of both physical and emotional stress over a prolonged period of time can be devastating. As Robert F. Kennedy notes about the Cuban Missile Crisis, "That kind of pressure does strange things to a human being, even to brilliant, self-confident, mature, experienced men. For some it brings out characteristics and strengths that perhaps even they never knew they had, and for others the pressure is too overwhelming."[23] Ted Sorensen, another participant in the Cuban Missile Crisis saw "during the long days and nights

of the Cuban Crisis, how brutally physical and mental fatigue can numb the good sense as well as the senses of normally articulate men."[24]

Bureaucratic Resistance:

As mentioned previously, in a crisis the traditional institutional and bureaucratic controls on a leader begin to fade, and individual or small group control emerges. This does not mean that the bureaucratic apparatus of government can be ignored.

Once decisions are made, implementation is turned over to the bureaucracy. Therefore, if one is to insure that the directives of the leadership are fully and accurately carried out, attention must be paid to how the permanent government receives and processes presidential decisions.

There is a tendency, once a crisis decision is made, to relax, to act as if the "real work" had been done. But such a temptation must be avoided. If decisions are not properly carried out, then all the good ideas and calculated moves may not salvage the poor execution.

Pre-Crises Steps:

When a political system is compelled to employ crisis management techniques, it is an indication that events are already at a critical stage. But can steps be taken prior to a crisis which may reduce the risks of crises emerging or, once emerged, can better prepare leaders to deal with the threat of crisis? Can we lay down a foundation for cooperation and/or peaceful competition which moves both parties away from conflict and threat?

Confidence-Building Measures:

There are a variety of steps governments can take to soften the harsher edges of conflict and competition between the super powers. While individually these steps may not appear to be overly significant, the cumulative effects might be positive. These confidence-building measures could enhance the prospects that disputes and conflicts might be settled before they reach the crisis stage. The guiding principle in this effort should be: start small and build.

An initial step might include developing links between citizens (e.g. open up and encourage travel), the military (e.g. conferences, meetings), the bureaucracy (e.g. share non-military information on pollution control, health care), business interests (e.g. trade). Also, cultural, scientific, educational and athletic exchanges might enhance understanding and cooperation. Communication and dialogue between leaders (both formal and informal contacts) must be maintained and increased—Ways to accomplish this include regularized summit meetings between heads of state: similar regularized meetings between the Secretaries of State and Defense with their Soviet counterparts; an improved and modernized direct communication system between the White House and the Kremlin (beyond the planned improvements in the "Hot Line").

Beyond efforts at improved communications between leaders, there are institutional links which can be developed. One of the more ambitious proposals calls for

a U.S.-Soviet Crisis Control Center. While there are a number of variations to this proposal, in its essence it calls for one center in the U.S. and another in the Soviet Union, each staffed by military, diplomatic, and political personnel from both countries. These centers would be connected by state of the arts teleconferencing and would monitor conflict points and exchange information.[25] They are intended to be crisis management centers, where each side could exchange views in a less ambiguous atmosphere; but during non-crisis periods, they could serve as centers for dialogue and communication between high-level military and civilian personnel of both nations. While there are potential risks in such centers (a country could mislead an adversary), the potential benefits may be sufficient for both countries to cautiously move ahead in developing a Crisis Control Center.

Certain procedural arrangements might also be employed which could set up pre-arranged "ground rules" for crisis interaction.[26] Such procedures, agreed to in advance of any conflict might induce a certain degree of mutual restraint in a crisis. While these ground rules would not be enforceable, they may serve as a mechanism whereby each side would recognize a mutual interest in adhering to the rules.[27]

Arms reduction is another component of a comprehensive crisis management system. With the spread of nuclear weapons, and with the addition of more sophisticated weaponry (e.g. cruise missiles) it becomes more difficult to "count" and verify weapons. Thus, we may be running out of time to reach mutual, verifiable agreements for arms control.

In an effort to control the risks of the spread of weapons, several factors must be considered. Bi-lateral nuclear arms control agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union are but one part of an overall arms reduction plan. Proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries is a significant risk to peace, as is the spread of conventional arms to less developed countries.[28]

In an effort to better manage a crisis, decision-makers must be aware of the problems mentioned earlier (e.g. time, information, stress), but can leaders be "taught" to handle crises better? To a degree, the answer is yes. Leaders can be trained in the techniques of crisis management, negotiation skills, response to stress, etc. One way to do this is through simulation. Leaders could play "crisis games" in which a world crisis is played out under the supervision of trained experts. In this way leaders could experience the types of crisis demands they may face in a real crisis.

Seminars in negotiating skills should also be included in such a leadership training program. A great deal of useful research has been done in this area,[29] and it is time to incorporate this knowledge into the decision-making process.

Conclusion:

We began by asking how threat could be turned into opportunity. Part of the answer, it was suggested, rests in crisis management. While there is no one, foolproof crisis management system, there is much which can be adopted which will reduce the likelihood that conflicts and crisis will burst out into war.

The logic of developing crisis control systems was expressed by King-Yuh Chang when he wrote that "What we are proposing are behavior patterns that would mini-

mize the possibility of war in a crisis situation. Obviously, we do not believe that the transition from crisis to war is inevitable or beyond human management."[30]

Crisis management offers an opportunity to reduce the threat of conflict turning into war, and provides a means whereby we may avoid crisis behavior in crisis situations. If presidents continue to face conflicts which threaten to lead to war—perhaps nuclear—then crisis control measures must be implemented.[31] The choice is not whether we will or will not face future crises. The choice is *how* we will face them.

Notes

1. I wish to thank Alexander L. George for pointing this out in the Introduction to his excellent collection of articles, *Managing U.S. — Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979).
2. See: Michael A. Genovese, *The Supreme Court, the Constitution, and Presidential Power* (Landham: University Press of America, 1980).
3. See: Michael A. Genovese, "Democratic Theory and the Emergency Powers of the President," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. IX, No. 3, Summer 1979.
4. Clinton Rossiter, *Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1948, pp. 297–306).
5. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1973, pp. 450–451).
6. Richard M. Pious, *The American Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 1979, p. 84).
7. Robert E. Di Clerico, *The American President* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979, pp. 309–310).
8. Of course, not all crises can be "managed." Some conflicts are of such an idiosyncratic nature as to defy understanding, not to mention management.
9. Hilliard Roderick, "What Can be Done?" in H. Roderick and U. Magnusson, *Avoiding Inadvertent War: Crisis Management* (Austin: The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, 1983, p. 170.
10. See: Richard Ned Lebow, *Beyond Peace and War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981), p. 337.
11. See: John Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (New York: Wiley, 1973).
12. William L. Ury and Richard Smoke, *Beyond the Hotline*: Controlling a Nuclear Crisis, March 1984, Nuclear Negotiations Project, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. iii.
13. See: Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: *A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969); Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
14. See: Robert C. McFarlane, Richard Saunders and Thomas C. Shull, "The National Security Council: Organization for Policy Making," in R. Gordon Hoxie, ed. *The Presidency and National Security Policy* (New York: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1984) pp. 261–73.
15. See: Alexander George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, No. 66, 1972, pp. 751–795.
16. See: Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
17. See: James D. Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J." Prentice-Hall, 1972); Alexander George, "Assessing Presidential Character," *World Politics*, No. 26, 1974).
18. See: Robert Jervis, "Hypothesis on Misperception, *World Politics*, XX, 1968: and Jack S. Levy, "Misperceptions and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkage and Analytical Problems," *World Politics*, October, 1983.
19. See: Strobe Talbott, *The Russians and Reagan* (New York: Vintage, 1984); Russell J. Leng, "Reagan and the Russians: Crisis Bargaining Beliefs and the Historical Record," *American Political Science Review*, June 1984; Lawrence T. Caldwell and Robert Legvold, "Reagan Through Soviet Eyes," *Foreign Policy* No. 52, Fall, 1983; Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "Reagan and Russia," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1982–83; Walter Laqueur, "Reagan and the Russians," *Commentary*, January 1982.

20. See: Charles Mc C Mathias, Jr., "Habitual Hatred—Unsound Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer, 1983.
21. See: John Meisel, "Communication and Crisis," in Daniel Frei, *Managing International Crisis* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982) pp 61–75.
22. See: Alexander L. George, "Crisis Management: Requirements and Problems," in Roderick and Magrusson, *op cit*, pp. 16–24; and Ole R. Holsti and Alexander L. George, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policymakers," in Cornelius P. Cotter, ed., *Political Science Annual*, Vol. 6, 1975 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1976) pp. 255–319.
23. Robert F. Kennedy, *op cit*, p 22.
24. Theodore C. Sorensen, *Decision-Making in the White House* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964) p. 76.
25. See: Barry M. Bleckman, "U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Risk Management Centers," in Roderick and Magnusson, *op cit* pp. 78–88; William Langer Ury, "U.S.-Soviet Crisis Center Might Avoid a New Sarajevo," *Los Angeles Times* September 16, 1983; Thomas L. Saaty, "Center for Conflict Resolution," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March, 1984.
26. See: Joanne Gowa and Nils H. Wessell, *Ground Rules: Soviet and American Involvement in Regional Conflicts* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1982).
27. Example of agreements which may serve as a starting point include: *Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, signed in Washington, September 30, 1971; and *Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War*, signed in Washington, June 27, 1973.
28. See: Solly Zuckerman, *Nuclear Illusion & Reality* (New York: Vintage, 1982); Andrew Wilson, The Disarmer's Handbook (New York: Penguin, 1983); and George F. Kennan, *The Nuclear Delusion* (New York: Pantheon, 1983).
29. See: Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981); I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982); and Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
30. King-Yuh Chang, "Practical Suggestions for Crisis Management: An Inventory," in Frei, *op cit.*, p. 208.
31. While the crisis management techniques outlined in this article can be very helpful to a decision maker, no tool or technique can serve as a replacement for sound judgement by a leader.